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Confronting Confrontation in a FaceTime 
Generation: A Substantial Public Policy Standard to 
Determine the Constitutionality of Two-Way Live 
Video Testimony in Criminal Trials 
“Got a problem with me, say it to my face, to my face, to my 
face . . . .”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The judge asks the prosecution to call its next witness against 
the criminal defendant. The judge and jury watch as the bailiff 
administers the oath to the witness, who swears to “tell the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”2 Then, the testimony 
begins—but the witness stand is empty. This is because the witness 
is testifying via two-way live video. His image appears on a large 
screen in the courtroom, visible to everyone—judge, jury, 
attorneys, defendant, and spectators.3 The witness likewise has his 
own screen on which he can see the entire courtroom.4 The 
testimony proceeds normally: direct examination and then cross-
examination. With the exception of the witness’s physical absence, 
the two-way live video testimony seems completely ordinary; and 
yet, the technological advancements that make this seemingly 
ordinary witness testimony possible present serious constitutional 
issues unforeseen by the Framers.  
This Comment addresses whether two-way live video 
testimony in criminal trials violates the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment, which ensures that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”5 The Supreme Court in Maryland 
v. Craig upheld one-way live video testimony in the context of 
child abuse cases to protect child victims from the presence of the 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA. 
 1. LUDACRIS, Say It to My Face, on 1.21 GIGAWATTS: BACK TO THE FIRST 
TIME (Self-released 2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Aidan C. O’Brien, Nothing but the Truth, THEGUARDIAN (May 
22, 2012, 9:01 AM), available at http://www.theguardian.com/law/belief/2012 
/may/22/abolish-oaths-court, archived at http://perma.cc/P2NH-SDMV. 
 3. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (describing how people in the courtroom could see the witness on the 
screen). 
 4. See id. (“[T]he witnesses could see the temporary courtroom in the U.S. 
Attorney’s conference room.”). This view, however, is not always immune from 
technical difficulties. See id. n.2 (noting “some technical difficulties that 
impacted the abilities of the witnesses”). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 




defendant, based on the “important public policy” of protecting 
child abuse victims from further traumatization.6 But courts and 
scholars have disagreed about whether and how to apply Craig to 
two-way live video testimony in contexts other than child abuse cases 
where there is no similarly important public policy.7 The Court’s 
subsequent upheaval of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in 
Crawford v. Washington especially complicates these disagreements 
because the Court rejected the concept of “reliability” that 
undergirded the Craig decision.8 Additionally, the Court’s 
Confrontation Clause decisions following Crawford have obscured 
the extent of Crawford’s holding, insomuch that scholars have 
described the decisions as “vague[], uncertain, unpredictable, a 
mess, almost arbitrary, incoherent, and an exercise in fiction.”9 
Amidst this unrest, prosecutors continue to use two-way live video 
testimony and defendants continue to challenge its use.10 As the 
popularity of such testimony grows,11 and the technological ease of 
                                                                                                             
 6. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 859–60 (1990); see also 
discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II. 
 8. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also discussion 
infra Part I.B.3. 
 9. Dylan O. Keenan, Note, Confronting Crawford v. Washington in the 
Lower Courts, 122 YALE L.J. 782, 786 (2012) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the disagreements surrounding Crawford are 
illustrated—and perhaps, complicated—by the Roberts Court’s willingness to hear 
Confrontation Clause cases nearly every term since Crawford. See Williams v. 
Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Hardy v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490 (2011); Greene 
v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (2011); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 
(2011); Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008); 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 
(2006); Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (2005). 
 10. Since 2012, the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony in 
criminal trials has been litigated dozens of times in state and federal courts. See, 
e.g., Collins v. Cain, No. 13–0251, 2013 WL 4891923 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2013); 
People v. Novak, 971 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Cnty. Ct. 2013); State v. Seelig, 738 S.E.2d 
427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Smith, 308 P.3d 135 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013); 
People v. Lujan, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727 (Ct. App. 2012) (modified on rehearing 
on other grounds); United States v. Sapse, No. 2:10–CR–00370–KJD, 2012 WL 
5334630 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2012); Rivera v. State, 381 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. App. 
2012); Paul v. State, No. 12–10–00280–CR, 2012 WL 3101743 (Tex. App. July 
31, 2012); People v. Buie, 817 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 2012); Kramer v. State, 277 
P.3d 88 (Wyo. 2012); United States v. Rosenau, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012). 
 11. In perhaps one of the most recent, infamous uses of live video testimony, 
the State of Florida attempted to introduce a professor’s testimony via Skype in 
George Zimmerman’s criminal trial for the shooting of Trayvon Martin. Suzanne 
Choney, Skype Pranksters Interrupt Zimmerman Witness Testimony, NBC NEWS 
(July 3, 2013, 5:35 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/technology/skype-pranksters-




using it increases, a workable and doctrinally sound constitutional 
standard for two-way live video testimony must be developed. 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a 
substantial public policy standard to determine the constitutionality of 
two-way live video testimony. This proposal primarily emphasizes 
that two-way video requires witnesses to do something that one-way 
video, such as the system used in Craig, does not: it requires witnesses 
to see the defendant and testify to the defendant’s face. Because of 
two-way video’s better approximation of true physical confrontation, 
this proposal lowers the bar that prosecutors must meet to use two-way 
live video testimony by replacing Craig’s important public policy test 
with a substantial public policy standard. This standard would allow 
prosecutors to use two-way live video testimony in cases where the 
use of such testimony would advance public policies that, although not 
as important as protecting child abuse victims, are substantial enough 
to further the administration of justice. The substantial public policy 
standard would be doctrinally sound, grounded in reasoning that 
follows a fortiori from Craig. Moreover, the standard would be 
workable in practice, utilizing as guideposts lower courts’ decisions to 
provide a framework for determining the circumstances in which two-
way live video testimony is constitutional under the Confrontation 
Clause. In an era where astounding technological advances are 
commonplace, two-way live video will only become faster, better, and 
easier. The proposed substantial public policy standard embraces this 
reality and embodies a pragmatic solution—a solution for 
confrontation in a FaceTime generation.12 
                                                                                                             
 
interrupt-zimmerman-witness-testimony-6C10528962, archived at http://perma.cc 
/8LS3-2QCY. The trial was streaming live on national television, and as a result, 
the general public could see the prosecutor’s Skype screen name. Id. Within 
seconds of the commencement of the testimony, dozens of people began to call the 
prosecutor, creating annoying “beeps” within the courtroom that signaled 
incoming calls. Id. The less-than-amused judge immediately discontinued the 
video testimony. Id.  
 12. FaceTime is a software service developed by Apple that allows users 
with Apple products to make two-way video calls to each other. See Daniel Eran 
Dilger, Inside iPhone 4: FaceTime Video Calling, APPLE INSIDER (June 8, 2010, 
6:00 PM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/10/06/08/inside_iphone_4_facetime 
_video_calling.html, archived at http://perma.cc/J9VS-WELP. The ease of 
videoconferencing via technology like FaceTime seems destined to become a 
hallmark of many aspects of life. See, e.g., Amit Jain, Visualize FaceTime as a 
Videowall—That Is What Next-Generation Video Conferencing Looks Like, 
BUSINESS 2 COMMUNITY (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.business2community.com 
/business-innovation/visualize-facetime-videowall-next-generation-video-confer 
encing-looks-like-0620630#!tbkn7, archived at http://perma.cc/B7C8-KC62. 




Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the historical 
origins of confrontation and the Court’s evolving interpretations of the 
Confrontation Clause. Part II turns to the difficulties surrounding two-
way live video testimony and collects judicial answers to the question 
of when such testimony violates the Confrontation Clause. By doing 
so, the analysis reveals that lower courts, in fact, mostly agree that 
Craig applies to two-way live video testimony; nonetheless, courts 
disagree about how the Craig test applies. Part II then takes the novel 
step of outlining scholars’ proposals addressing two-way live video 
testimony. This examination subsequently describes the various 
counterarguments to these proposals, revealing the deep disagreements 
illustrative of the general confusion surrounding the constitutionality 
of two-way live video testimony. To resolve this disagreement, Part III 
proposes a standard that allows the use of two-way live video 
testimony that advances both important public policies and public 
policies that are less important than Craig’s articulated policy of 
protecting child abuse victims. Recognizing two-way live video’s 
superior replication of true physical confrontation, this proposal 
argues that prosecutors should not have to meet Craig’s important 
public policy requirement because a defendant’s rights under the 
Confrontation Clause are better protected by two-way live video than 
by one-way live video. This proposal thus presents the Court with the 
best means of preserving Craig, reconciling differing judicial and 
scholarly opinions, and addressing the increasingly prevalent use of 
two-way live video testimony in criminal trials. 
I. THE BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF CONFRONTATION 
The Confrontation Clause lacks any legislative history that 
might indicate its sources, justifications, or purposes.13 References 
                                                                                                             
 13. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 
176 n.8 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he usual primary sources and 
digests of the early debates contain no informative material on the confrontation 
right . . . .”); ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1992) (noting that the “origins of confrontation are 
obscure”); FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1951) (stating that the 
development of the right to confrontation cannot be definitively traced); 
Matthew J. Tokson, Comment, Virtual Confrontation: Is Videoconference 
Testimony by an Unavailable Witness Constitutional?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 
1585 (2007) (“There is virtually no traditional legislative history on the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.”); Jessica Brooks, Note, Two-Way Video 
Testimony and the Confrontation Clause: Protecting Vulnerable Victims After 
Crawford, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 183, 187 (2012) (“There is a virtual lack of 
legislative history pertaining to the adoption of the Confrontation Clause into the 
Sixth Amendment.”). 




to the right to confrontation, however, have existed since Biblical 
times under Hebrew and Roman law in that both traditions 
required witnesses to testify in person in the defendant’s 
presence.14 For example, when chief priests and elders of the Jews 
called for the apostle Paul’s death, Roman governor Festus replied: 
“It is not the custom of the Romans to deliver any man to 
destruction before the accused meets the accusers face to face.”15 
Yet, although the Church initially adhered to this right to 
confrontation after the legal establishment of Christianity in the 
Roman Empire,16 ecclesiastical and secular courts soon crippled 
that right, giving way to private examinations outside the presence 
of the defendant.17 A similar absence of the right to confrontation 
                                                                                                             
 14. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“The right of an accused to meet his accusers face-to-face is 
mentioned in, among other things, the Bible . . . .” (citing Acts 25:16)); Richard 
D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1171, 1202 (2002) (“The ancient Hebrews required accusing witnesses to give 
their testimony in front of the accused . . . .”); Norman W. Spaulding, The 
Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due Process, and the Dead 
Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 330 (2012) (“Recent research 
reveals that the right of confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses . . . 
[has] roots in . . . Hebrew law . . . .”). Roman criminal law utilized an 
accusatorial model of criminal procedure that entailed a “viva voce 
requirement.” See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the 
Accuser: Ancient and Medieval Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 481, 484 (1994) (“Roman criminal procedure . . . was accusatorial.”). 
This requirement demanded that witnesses appear in person and testify orally 
before the trier of fact. Id. at 485–89; Frank R. Herrmann, The Establishment of 
a Rule Against Hearsay in Romano-Canonical Procedure, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 
42 (1995) (“Witnesses are said to be [those] who say those things in person 
[viva voce] . . . .”).  
 15. Acts 25:16 (New King James Version). 
 16. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 14, at 494 (noting that the Church 
prioritized having the accused and accuser simultaneously present in an 
adjudicatory forum). 
 17. Id. at 515. Legal scholars contended that private examinations prevented 
parties from telling their own witnesses what other witnesses had said, thereby 
enabling the best means of obtaining truthful testimony. Id. at 516. This 
procedure came to be known as the “Daniel and Susanna” procedure. Id. at 518. 
The name of the procedure comes from a biblical narrative concerning Susanna, 
a woman who spurned the advances of two men. Daniel 13:1–63. In revenge, 
the two men falsely accused Susanna of committing adultery with a young man 
in an orchard. Id. An assembly of the people conducted a trial of Susanna and 
initially believed the men, condemning her to death. Id. Daniel was moved by 
the spirit of God at this point and intervened. Id. He examined each of the men 
separately and out of the other’s presence. Id. He then asked each man to name 
the tree under which the man allegedly saw Susanna with a lover. Id. One man 
said it was a mastic tree. Id. The other man said it was an oak tree. Id. The 
glaring discrepancy convinced the assembly that the men were lying, and 
Susanna was acquitted. Id. 




existed in England at the time of the formation of the colonies.18 
Indeed, the use of ex parte examinations effectively denied 
defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them.19 It is 
this abuse of the right to confrontation in England that likely 
influenced the drafters of state constitutions and the United States 
Constitution to support and implement confrontation clauses.20 
Therefore, this Part provides a summary of the history of 
confrontation that preceded the adoption of the Confrontation 
Clause, beginning in England and concluding with the adoption of 
the Sixth Amendment. It then discusses the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the Confrontation Clause. 
A. The Historical Foundations of Confrontation: From England to 
the United States 
In the seventeenth century, English courts did not require the 
production of witnesses or their examinations in court.21 As a 
result, prosecutors routinely introduced depositions in lieu of live 
courtroom testimony over the defendants’ requests for face-to-face 
confrontation.22 Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial for treason in 1603 
popularly serves as one of the most frequently cited examples of 
these abuses.23 Accused of plotting to assassinate James VI of 
Scotland, Raleigh attempted to defend against written accusations.24 
                                                                                                             
 18. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 21. Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 
537, 543 (2003). To be sure, witnesses did testify before juries in England at this 
time; nevertheless, the prosecution largely decided whether they were called to 
testify or whether they testified by deposition. Id. n.21. 
 22. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004) (1 JAMES 
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 
(London, MacMillan & Co. 1883)). 
 23. E.g., Charles R. Nesson & Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Hearsay: 
Requiring Foundational Testing and Corroboration Under the Confrontation 
Clause, 81 VA. L. REV. 149, 150 (1995) (“More than any other story, the story 
of Raleigh’s case, handed down over generations, has driven Anglo-American 
lawyers to limit the use of hearsay and to ensure a right of confrontation.”); 
White, supra note 21, at 541 (“History teaches that the [Confrontation] Clause 
has far earlier beginnings [than Raleigh’s trial], but it remains emotionally linked 
with the conviction, and eventual beheading, of Raleigh based on proof made through 
ex parte affidavits.”); Raymond LaMagna, Note, (Re)Constitutionalizing 
Confrontation: Reexamining Unavailability and the Value of Live Testimony, 79 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1520 (2006) (“Legendary among [defendants demanding 
face-to-face confrontation] was Sir Walter Raleigh, whose 1603 trial for treason 
is popularly credited with embedding confrontation into the public’s conception 
of justice.”). 
 24. Raleigh’s Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603). 




Specifically, the prosecution relied upon a sworn confession signed by 
Raleigh’s alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham.25 In response, 
Raleigh demanded that Cobham be present in the courtroom to deliver 
his testimony.26 The court rejected Raleigh’s protests.27 Raleigh was 
thereafter convicted and sentenced to die.28 Consequently, the 
relatively recent history of similar injustices during the revolutionary 
period undeniably contributed to the adoption of confrontation clauses 
in the United States.29 
With these abuses of ex parte examinations at common law in 
mind, the language in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause likely finds its roots in early state constitutions.30 Scholars 
generally agree that Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England was the primary source for the drafting of confrontation 
clauses in state constitutions.31 In 1776, Virginia was the first state 
                                                                                                             
 25. See White, supra note 21, at 542 (“The prosecution, led by Sir Edward 
Coke, introduced evidence in the form of a sworn confession from Raleigh’s 
alleged co-conspirator, Lord Cobham.”). 
 26. Raleigh’s Trial, 2 How. St. Tr. at 15 (“But it is strange to see how you 
press me still with my Lord Cobham, and yet will not produce him . . . . [H]e is 
in the house hard by, and may soon be brought hither; let him be produced, and 
if he will accuse me or avow this confession of his, it shall convict me and ease 
you of further proof.”).  
 27. Id. Interestingly enough, the same judge who rejected Raleigh’s 
arguments later praised the virtues of live testimony. See LaMagna, supra note 
23, at 1521 (“For the Testimonies, being viva voce before the Judges in open 
face of the world . . . [are] much to be preferred before written depositions by 
private examiners or Commissioners. First, for that the Judge and Jurors discern 
often by the countenance of a Witness whether he come prepared, and by his 
readiness and slackness, whether he be ill affected or well affected, and by short 
questions may draw out circumstances to approve or discredit his testimony, and 
one witness may contest with another where they are viva voce. All which are 
taken away by written depositions.” (quoting Case of the Union of the Realms, 
(1606) 72 Eng. Rep. 908, 913 (K.B.) (Popham, C.J.))); see also White, supra 
note 21, at 543 (“Because Raleigh was denied that right [of confrontation] and 
quickly sentenced to die, one of the four trial judges later lamented that the trial 
had injured and degraded the justice of England.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 28. As one scholar notes, the King later pardoned Raleigh, but kept him in 
the tower of London. See White, supra note 21, at 543 n.20. After many years, 
Raleigh was ultimately executed for additional offenses and treason that were 
“not pardonable.” Id. 
 29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 30. White, supra note 21, at 550. 
 31. Id. at 551 n.78 (“These volumes were avidly sought in the colonies and 
had inestimable impact there on the development and growth of the law and 
legal attitudes.” (quoting Murl A. Larkin, The Right of Confrontation: What 
Next?, 1 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 67, 72 (1969))). To be sure, Blackstone’s writings 
were quite persuasive with respect to the preference for live, in person 
examination and its benefits. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 




to complete its Declaration of Rights, which included a defendant’s 
right “in all capital or criminal prosecutions . . . to be confronted 
with the accusers and witnesses.”32 Over the next eight years, 
seven other states constructed and adopted similar confrontation 
clauses in their respective constitutions.33 This trend culminated in 
the adoption of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.34 
                                                                                                             
 
*373–75 (“This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all 
mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than the private 
and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk, in 
the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice from 
the civil law: where a witness may frequently depose that in private, which he 
will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal . . . . Besides the 
occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the 
witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of 
interrogatories previously penned and settled: and the confronting of adverse 
witnesses is also another opportunity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can 
never be had upon any other method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge, 
during the examination, a matter of small importance; for besides the respect 
and awe, with which his presence will naturally inspire the witness, he is able by 
use and experience to keep the evidence from wandering from the point in issue. 
In short by this method of examination, and this only, the persons who are to 
decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, 
education, understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in which 
points all persons must appear alike; when their depositions are reduced to 
writing, and read to the judge, in the absence of those who made them: and yet 
as much may be frequently collected from the manner in which the evidence is 
delivered, as from the matter of it.”); see also supra note 14 (discussing viva 
voce requirement). 
 32. Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776), reprinted in 1 BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 235 (1971); 
Larkin, supra note 31, at 75. 
 33. See Delaware Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776), reprinted in 1 THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 278; Maryland 
Declaration of Rights § XIX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 282; Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights § XII (1780), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 32, at 342; New Hampshire Bill of Rights § XV (1783), 
reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, 
at 377; North Carolina Declaration of Rights § VII (1776), reprinted in 1 THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 287; 
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § IX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 265; Vermont 
Declaration of Rights Ch. I, § X (1777), reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 32, at 323. 
 34. See, e.g., White, supra note 21, at 550 (“Despite the general agreement 
that confrontation rights have ambiguous beginnings and that no history of the 
Clause can be proclaimed with certainty, it is without question that the language 
ultimately used in the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was derived from 
state constitutions.”).  




Indeed, many of the individuals who drafted and ratified the Bill of 
Rights were the drafters of these state constitutions, and so they 
observed firsthand the development of the American adversarial 
system, including the right to confrontation.35 Thus, it is 
unsurprising that the draft of the Bill of Rights included the right to 
confrontation in what would become the Sixth Amendment.36 
This right to confrontation, however, was not included in the 
original text of the United States Constitution. During the formation of 
the Constitution, Abraham Holmes of the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention objected that the proposed document did not guarantee 
“whether [a defendant] is to be allowed to meet his accuser face to 
face; whether he is to be allowed to confront the witnesses.”37 A 
compromise materialized thereafter, and the states agreed to ratify the 
Constitution as proposed on the condition that the first Congress 
would adopt a bill of rights, which would encompass, inter alia, an 
amendment ensuring the right to confrontation.38 On June 8, 1789, 
James Madison introduced to the House of Representatives a proposal 
that would become the Sixth Amendment,39 which substantially 
mirrored the language used in the Virginia Constitution.40 In 
particular, it guaranteed that an accused would have the right to be 
confronted “with his accusers, and the witnesses against him.”41 A 
subsequent revision deleted the words “his accusers,”42 and the 
final version of the Sixth Amendment provided: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
                                                                                                             
 35. Id. at 552. These drafters necessarily also witnessed the attempts of 
England to interfere with the right to confrontation by removing accused 
defendants to England for trial. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 110–11 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 
1836). 
 38. LaMagna, supra note 23, at 1525. 
 39. Id. 
 40. White, supra note 21, at 552 (“When James Madison introduced the 
Sixth Amendment[,] it contained substantially the same language as that used in 
the Virginia Constitution.”). 
 41. Id. (citing Larkin, supra note 31, at 76). 
 42. Id. 




process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense.43 
This version of the Sixth Amendment contains what is now known 
as the “Confrontation Clause” and was adopted on December 15, 
1791.44  
B. The Supreme Court’s Interpretations of the Confrontation 
Clause 
Because of the relative dearth of historical interpretive 
materials to explain the Confrontation Clause, for a long time the 
Supreme Court felt free to follow its own interpretive path.45 At the 
beginning of this path, the Court developed a test centered upon 
reliability and public policy, exemplified in the video-testimony 
context by Maryland v. Craig.46 More recently, however, the Court 
has undertaken an originalist reconstruction of its Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence focused on the notions of “testimoniality,” 
witness unavailability, and the defendant’s opportunity for cross-
examination, as articulated in Crawford v. Washington.47 This 
Section describes this evolution. 
1. Reliability and Important Public Policies: The Path to Craig 
At the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court set 
forth its first significant interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 
which ensured the right to confrontation unless public policy 
overrode that right.48 At issue in Mattox v. United States was the 
admission of a stenographer’s notes of a dead witness’s testimony 
from a prior trial as evidence in a new criminal trial.49 The 
Supreme Court emphasized that the Confrontation Clause compels 
                                                                                                             
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 44. LaMagna, supra note 23, at 1525. 
 45. See, e.g., Charles F. Baird, The Confrontation Clause: Why Crawford v. 
Washington Does Nothing More Than Maintain the Status Quo, 47 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 305, 305–06 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court’s Confrontation 
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a witness to face the defendant and jury so that those individuals 
may affect and assess the witness’s demeanor.50 Yet, the Court 
noted that this right to confrontation “must occasionally give way 
to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.”51 
Ultimately, the Court admitted the notes of the witness’s prior 
testimony, holding that public policy prohibits a criminal from 
going free just because a witness died and thus could not testify.52 
Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court added the concept of 
reliability to guide analyses in which public policies may trump the 
right to confrontation.53 In Ohio v. Roberts, a witness testified at a 
preliminary hearing but did not show up to testify at trial.54 The 
court admitted the transcript of the witness’s prior testimony over 
the defendant’s objection.55 Affirming the admission of the 
transcript, the Court proceeded as it did in Mattox, contending that 
certain competing interests and policies might justify dispensing 
with confrontation at trial.56 For these situations, the Court created 
a two-pronged test, which allowed prior testimony if: (1) the 
witness was unavailable;57 and (2) the testimony had sufficient 
“indicia of reliability.”58 Applying this test, the Court concluded 
that the witness was unavailable and that her prior testimony was 
reliable by definition because the witness testified under oath and 
was subjected to cross-examination.59 Thus, the Roberts Court 
refined its Mattox analysis and laid the foundation upon which the 
Craig Court would later consider the constitutionality of one-way 
live video testimony. 
2. Craig: The Constitutionality of One-Way Live Video 
Testimony 
In Maryland v. Craig, Justice O’Connor phrased the question 
before the Court as whether the Confrontation Clause “prohibits a 
child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a 
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 51. Id. at 243. 
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 54. Id. at 58–59. 
 55. Id. at 59–60. 
 56. Id. at 64. 
 57. A court may consider a witness “unavailable” under several situations. 
See FED. R. EVID. 804 (listing scenarios). 
 58. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
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defendant at trial, outside the defendant’s physical presence, by 
one-way closed circuit television.”60 In Craig, a grand jury 
indicted Sandra Ann Craig with child abuse.61 At trial, the State 
invoked a Maryland statutory procedure that sanctioned the use of 
one-way closed circuit television to procure a child’s testimony if, 
during normal testimony, the child would suffer serious emotional 
distress in the presence of the accused.62 Under this procedure, the 
child, the prosecutor, and defense counsel withdrew to a separate 
room while the judge, jury, and defendant remained in the 
courtroom.63 The parties then examined and cross-examined the 
child in the separate room, while a video monitor streamed the live 
video and audio of the examination in the courtroom.64 Craig 
remained in electronic contact with her defense counsel and the 
parties entered objections, which the court ruled on as if the 
witness were in the courtroom.65 Nonetheless, Craig objected to 
use of the procedure on Confrontation Clause grounds.66 
The Court upheld the use of the one-way video testimony in a 
5-4 decision.67 The Court primarily enumerated four fundamental 
requirements of the Confrontation Clause: (1) physical presence of 
the witness; (2) testimony by the witness under oath; (3) cross-
examination of the witness by defense counsel; and (4) observation 
of the witness’s demeanor by the jury.68 The Court acknowledged 
that the video testimony in question did not demand the physical 
presence of the witness.69 Nevertheless, the Court contended that 
the clear satisfaction of the three remaining factors made the 
child’s testimony sufficiently reliable.70 The Court further 
reinforced its argument by highlighting the compelling state 
interests in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of 
child abuse victims.71 Thus, emphasizing its “non-absolute” 
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interpretation of the right of confrontation,72 the Court held that 
one-way live video testimony is constitutional on two conditions: 
(1) the state must make a showing of necessity by demonstrating 
an important public policy of protecting child witnesses from the 
trauma of testifying in the defendant’s presence;73 and (2) the 
procedure, despite the absence of physical confrontation, must 
ensure the reliability of the evidence by preserving the essence of 
effective confrontation.74 This is the test that courts typically 
extend to govern two-way live video testimony.75 
3. Crawford: An Overhaul of Confrontation Clause 
Jurisprudence 
In 2004, however, the Supreme Court retreated from its initial 
emphasis on reliability, effectively transforming its Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence. In Crawford v. Washington, Michael Crawford 
was charged with assault and attempted murder for stabbing Kenneth 
Lee.76 At trial, Crawford argued self-defense.77 This theory, however, 
conflicted with a recorded statement given by Crawford’s wife during 
a police interrogation prior to Crawford’s trial, suggesting that perhaps 
Crawford did not stab Lee in self-defense.78 Because of a state marital 
privilege rule that prohibited a spouse from testifying without the other 
spouse’s consent, Crawford’s wife was unable to testify.79 Thus, the 
prosecution attempted to introduce her recorded statement in lieu of 
her live testimony.80 The trial court admitted the statement into 
evidence,81 which Crawford alleged to be a violation of his 
constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause.82 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia conducted a historical 
analysis to ultimately hold that the admission of the recorded statement 
violated Crawford’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.83 Justice 
Scalia emphasized that the Confrontation Clause’s fundamental 
protection is its assurance of reliable testimony.84 Here, however, the 
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Court diverged from its prior jurisprudence.85 Although it 
acknowledged that the Confrontation Clause demands reliable 
testimony, the Court argued that the Roberts test injected subjective 
judicial determinations that were detrimental to the spirit of the 
Confrontation Clause.86 Instead, Justice Scalia stated that history 
dictates that the primary safeguards of confrontation entail witness 
unavailability and cross-examination of the witness.87 Thus, the Court 
overruled the Roberts test and its subscription to unilateral judicial 
determinations of reliability.88 The Court held that the prosecution 
may admit testimonial89 hearsay only if: (1) the witness is unavailable; 
and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness.90 This is the now well-known Crawford test. 
So, Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
demonstrates that there are two arguably viable tests—the Craig test 
and the Crawford test—that might govern the constitutionality of two-
way live video testimony. However, each test has potential drawbacks. 
Some scholars question whether Craig is still good law after Crawford 
given the Craig Court’s reliance upon Roberts for its understanding of 
reliability and the Crawford Court’s subsequent rejection of Roberts.91 
On the other hand, some courts and scholars question whether video 
testimony should be considered hearsay for the purposes of 
Crawford.92 That is, because Crawford expressly addressed 
testimonial hearsay,93 which is an out of court statement that the 
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 86. Id. at 62–69. 
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 88. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“I dissent 
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 90. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 91. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 92. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
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flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would 
an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny 
altogether. Where testimonial [hearsay] is at issue, however, the Sixth 




declarant does not make while testifying at trial,94 it seems that live 
testimony at trial via video is not hearsay within the purview of 
Crawford.95 This uncertainty is illustrated—and compounded—by 
numerous approaches to the constitutional question. 
II. APPROACHES TO TWO-WAY LIVE VIDEO TESTIMONY UNDER THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Against this historical and jurisprudential backdrop, lower 
courts and scholars attempting to apply the underlying principles 
of confrontation to two-way live video testimony have come to 
vastly different conclusions. This Part first reviews how the federal 
circuit courts have addressed the issue, analyzing decisions that 
have applied Craig and found the testimony both constitutional 
and unconstitutional and discussing the Second Circuit’s decision 
to not apply Craig at all. It then outlines four popular proposals by 
scholars and responses that have been made to each proposal. 
A. Federal Circuit Courts’ Approaches 
Many scholars have noted a purported circuit split in the 
federal circuit courts’ approaches to two-way live video testimony 
because the Second Circuit has refused to apply Craig to two-way 
video.96 This Section illustrates, however, that although there is a 
circuit split that hinges upon whether to apply Craig to two-way 
live video testimony, the majority of circuit courts that have 
addressed the issue fall on one side of the split—Craig applies.97 
Thus, while there is technically a “circuit split” on whether to 
apply Craig at all, it is quite lopsided and there is mostly a 
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consensus among the circuits. However, there is widespread 
disagreement on the more practical question of how to apply Craig 
to two-way live video testimony. This Section describes the 
circumstances where courts have applied Craig and found such 
testimony constitutional, circumstances where courts have applied 
Craig and found such testimony unconstitutional, and finally the 
Second Circuit’s refusal to apply Craig altogether. It then concludes 
by highlighting principles that contextualize the following analysis of 
scholarship. 
1. Federal Circuit Courts Applying Craig and Finding Two-
Way Video Testimony Constitutional 
After Craig, circuit courts began to extend the Craig test to 
two-way live video testimony in child abuse cases, reading Craig 
to protect child victims from the presence of the defendant rather 
than from the image of the defendant. In these cases, courts 
routinely held such testimony constitutional as long as the lower 
courts found that the child displayed a fear of being in the 
defendant’s presence.98 For example, in United States v. Weekley, 
the Sixth Circuit upheld the use of two-way live video testimony 
because the district court determined that the child “genuinely 
feared” the defendant and there was a “substantial likelihood that 
[the child] would suffer emotional trauma” if required to testify in 
the defendant’s presence.99 Similarly, in United States v. Rouse, 
the Eighth Circuit upheld two-way live video testimony because 
the district court found that the children believed that the 
defendants would attack them if they entered the courtroom.100 
Numerous other circuits have come to identical conclusions in 
similar cases.101 
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Courts likewise began to apply Craig to two-way live video 
testimony in contexts other than child abuse cases. For example, in 
Horn v. Quarterman, the prosecution in a Texas trial attempted to 
introduce a witness’s testimony via two-way live video because the 
witness was terminally ill with cancer and undergoing treatment in 
Ohio.102 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that Craig governed the 
inquiry into the constitutionality of the two-way live video 
testimony.103 Specifically, the court recognized that the trial court 
had conducted the “case-specific finding of necessity” mandated 
by Craig by determining that the witness was ill and could not 
travel.104 Accordingly, the court found that the terminally ill 
witness’s testimony via two-way live video was constitutionally 
sound.105 Similarly, in United States v. Benson, the Sixth Circuit 
faced a situation where the witness who testified via two-way live 
video was 85 years old and too ill to travel.106 Addressing the 
defendant’s appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court’s 
considerations of the witness’s major stomach surgery in the 
previous year, extensive health problems, severe weight loss, and 
fatigue satisfied the Craig test.107 Thus, many circuit courts have 
applied Craig to both child abuse cases and non-child abuse cases, 
allowing two-way live video testimony in a wide range of 
scenarios as long as both the reliability and important public policy 
prongs of the Craig test were satisfied. 
2. Federal Circuit Courts Applying Craig and Finding Two-
Way Video Testimony Unconstitutional 
On the other hand, many circuit courts have extended Craig to 
consider two-way live video testimony but have found the use of 
such testimony unconstitutional because the facts in those cases 
did not satisfy the Craig test.108 In the child-abuse context, for 
example, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bordeaux held that 
the district court’s considerations of and emphasis on a child’s fear 
did not satisfy the Craig test.109 Specifically, the court found that, 
because the child’s fear of the defendant was not the “dominant 
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reason” why she could not testify in open court, use of two-way 
live video testimony did not serve Craig’s important public policy 
requirement.110 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in United States v. 
Moses found a child’s testimony via two-way live video 
unconstitutional under the Confrontation Clause because the child 
told the district court that she was not afraid of the defendant.111 
Moreover, the court emphasized that courts commonly agree that a 
child’s general fear of the courtroom is not sufficient to satisfy the 
Craig test.112 
In a non-child abuse context, the Eleventh Circuit sitting en 
banc likewise found that two-way live video testimony violated a 
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause because mere 
efficiency of live video does not satisfy Craig.113 In United States 
v. Yates, the federal government moved to allow two Australian 
witnesses to testify via two-way live video.114 The government 
emphasized that, although the witnesses were unwilling to travel to 
the United States to testify (and were beyond the government’s 
subpoena powers), they were willing to testify via live video.115 
The government also argued that the witnesses were essential to its 
case-in-chief, and the district court agreed.116 On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that such testimony violated the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.117 Relying upon circuit precedent, the court 
affirmed that Craig is the appropriate test to determine the 
admissibility of two-way live video testimony.118 The court then 
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applied the two-pronged Craig analysis, focusing specifically on 
the “important public policy” prong.119 Of course, presenting the 
fact-finder with crucial evidence is an important public policy.120 
Nevertheless, the court held that this policy was not important 
enough to outweigh the defendant’s right to confront her accusers 
face to face.121 The court noted that all criminal prosecutions 
include evidence “crucial” to the government’s case.122 Moreover, 
prosecutors could undoubtedly resolve more criminal cases 
efficiently if it were unnecessary for witnesses to appear physically 
at trial.123 Yet, the court reasoned that, if courts were to approve 
this testimony for mere efficiency purposes, prosecutors would 
argue for blanket rules allowing two-way live video testimony 
under the guise of providing crucial prosecutorial evidence and 
resolving cases expeditiously.124 Surely, the court opined, this was 
not the type of important public policy that the Craig Court 
required.125 
Furthermore, the court emphasized that, under Craig, video 
testimony must be necessary, not just more convenient, to further 
an important public policy.126 The court held that “[i]n this case, 
there simply is no necessity of the type Craig contemplates.”127 In 
particular, the court noted that there were other available avenues 
to obtain the testimony, including procedures for taking video 
depositions.128 Consequently, the court concluded that this case 
was no different from any other criminal prosecution in which the 
government would find it convenient to present testimony via two-
way live video.129 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the video 
testimony in this case did not further an “important enough” public 
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policy under the demands of Craig.130 As a result, the testimony 
violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.131 
3. The Second Circuit’s Rejection of Craig in United States v. 
Gigante 
In contrast with this nearly universal acceptance of Craig’s 
reasoning in the context of two-way live video testimony, the 
Second Circuit in one notable instance refused to apply the Craig 
test to such testimony.132 In United States v. Gigante, the government 
charged Mafia member Vincent Gigante with murder and labor 
racketeering, alleging that he was the boss of the Genovese crime 
family.133 A man named Peter Savino, a former associate of the 
Genovese crime family, was a crucial witness against Gigante.134 
Savino had previously cooperated with the government and was a 
participant in the Federal Witness Protection Program.135 At the time 
of Gigante’s trial, Savino was in the final stages of inoperable, fatal 
cancer and was under medical supervision at a secret location.136 
Thus, the government moved to allow Savino to testify via two-
way live video.137 The district court allowed the testimony over 
Gigante’s objection.138 
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the testimony as 
constitutional—but not under the Craig test.139 Instead, the court 
distinguished Craig, arguing that the Craig Court crafted the 
“important public policy” standard exclusively for one-way video 
testimony, “whereby the witness could not possibly view the 
defendant.”140 Here, the court contended, the district court used a 
two-way system through which the witness could see the 
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defendant.141 Correspondingly, the court opined that two-way 
video preserves the essence of confrontation in a manner that the 
one-way video in Craig could not.142 For this reason, the court 
concluded that it was unnecessary to enforce Craig’s arguably high 
“important public policy” standard in this case.143 
Rather, the Second Circuit upheld the video testimony by 
analogy to the protections afforded by Rule 15 depositions.144 
Under Rule 15, parties may take a deposition “[w]henever[,] due to 
exceptional circumstances of the case[,] it is in the interest of 
justice that the testimony of a prospective witness of a party be 
taken and preserved for use at trial.”145 That testimony may then be 
admitted at trial “as substantive evidence if the witness is 
unavailable.”146 The Second Circuit noted that a court could 
consider a witness unavailable if he or she “is unable to be present 
or to testify at the hearing because of . . . physical or mental illness 
or infirmity.”147 The Second Circuit reasoned that the trial court 
could have admitted Savino’s testimony via these rules.148 
Moreover, the court argued, two-way live video testimony actually 
afforded greater protection of Gigante’s confrontation rights than 
Rule 15 could afford because it forced Savino to testify live before 
a jury, which in turn allowed the jury to assess his demeanor.149 
Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that it could not hold two-
way live video testimony to a higher standard than the Rule 15 
standard.150 In so holding, the court articulated its rule: “[u]pon a 
finding of exceptional circumstances, such as were found in this 
case, a trial court may allow a witness to testify via two-way 
closed-circuit television when this furthers the interest of 
justice.”151 
From this survey of circuit court cases, two main points emerge 
concerning the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. 
First, with the exception of the Second Circuit, the federal circuit 
courts, as well as many district courts and state courts,152 seem to 
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generally accept Craig as the appropriate test for determining the 
constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. So, although 
there is a circuit split, it is a very unbalanced one. The consensus 
about which test should apply is actually fairly strong. Second, the 
inconsistencies that do percolate amongst the lower courts seem to 
stem not from troubles determining whether the Craig test applies, 
but from efforts to determine how Craig applies—namely (1) what 
constitutes an “important public policy” under Craig; and (2) 
whether that definition varies depending upon which type of 
system, one-way video or two-way video, is in question. Indeed, 
these cases illustrate the confusion that stems from a type of 
“vertical” analysis where courts measure the circumstances in each 
case against the high standard of an important public policy 
protecting child abuse victims. 
B. Scholars’ Approaches 
This conflicting jurisprudence has, in turn, encouraged a 
diverse array of proposals put forth by scholars in an attempt to 
solve the two-way live video testimony issue. This Section groups 
the most popular proposals into four categories: those in favor of 
complete constitutionality of the testimony; those who argue that 
Crawford governs the testimony; those who claim that Craig 
governs the testimony; and those who assert that all such testimony 
is unconstitutional. This Section describes the arguments in favor 
of each proposal and then discusses scholars’ objections to each 
proposal.153 
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1. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Undoubtedly 
Constitutional 
Some scholars have argued that two-way live video testimony 
is constitutional in all cases.154 A number of these scholars base 
their arguments upon the four elements of confrontation that Craig 
emphasized: (1) personal examination; (2) testimony under oath; 
(3) cross-examination of the witness by defense counsel; and (4) 
observation of the witness by the jury.155 First, with respect to 
personal examination, two-way live video testimony satisfies this 
element because it subjects the witness to personal examination 
that the defendant can fully observe.156 Second, the witness is 
placed under oath prior to the commencement of the witness’s 
testimony.157 Third, the defendant has the same opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness testifying via the two-way live video 
feed.158 Finally, the jury is given a full opportunity, and quite 
possibly a better opportunity, to view the witness and the witness’s 
demeanor during video testimony because the witness’s image is 
projected onto a large television or screen.159 Accordingly, these 
scholars argue, two-way live video testimony preserves the values 
mandated by the Confrontation Clause.160 
One objection to this argument is that lazy parties might rely too 
heavily upon the ease of two-way live video testimony, thereby 
destroying the Confrontation Clause’s seemingly inherent 
preference for physical, face-to-face confrontation.161 Historically, 
confrontation has almost exclusively entailed the simultaneous 
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physical presence of both the accused and the accuser.162 Moreover, 
the public policy exception established by the Court anticipates 
circumstances in which allowing the testimony would further an 
important public policy.163 Allowing universal constitutionality of 
two-way live video testimony would prevent courts from 
considering important policies depending upon the unique 
circumstances at hand.164 Thus, this objection argues, parties should 
not be able to enact (at will) such a broad, sweeping use of new 
technology that completely changes the manner in which courts 
receive testimony.165 The ease of new technology should not by 
itself overrule centuries of physical confrontation simply because it 
is easier than requiring a witness’s physical presence in the 
courtroom. 
Relatedly, critics object that efficiency gains alone should not 
suffice to eliminate a defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights 
under the Confrontation Clause.166 This objection is most 
commonly made in rebuttal to the argument that sometimes the 
testimony is so non-accusatorial and the disadvantages of requiring 
a witness’s physical presence are so great that the efficiency of 
video testimony is clearly superior to any reasonable expectation 
of physical confrontation.167 Objectors point out that this argument 
is contrary to contemporary understandings of constitutional rights, 
under which mere efficiency cannot justify the elimination of a 
constitutional right.168 
Finally, one of the most common objections is that two-way 
live video testimony eliminates the emotional tension in the 
courtroom that stems from physical confrontation, thereby making 
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it easier for witnesses to lie and harder for juries to tell whether the 
witnesses are lying.169 This objection specifically targets the 
validity of the witness’s oath and the fact-finder’s fair observation 
of the witness’s demeanor.170 This argument assumes that 
witnesses will have a greater propensity to lie if they do not have 
to physically look into the eyes of the defendant, attorneys, judge, 
and jury.171 In response to the argument that the witness can “feel” 
the courtroom looking at him or her via the screen, objectors claim 
that it is simply not the same as true physical presence.172 
Moreover, objecting scholars argue that such testimony deprives 
the fact-finder of the ability to adequately observe the intangibles 
of the witness’s demeanor.173 For example, the fact-finder may not 
be able to watch the witness physically walk to the witness stand or 
observe certain fluctuations in the witness’s voice and facial 
features. This objection boils down to a preference for a fact-
finder’s inherent need to “feel” the witness’s presence in order to 
adequately gauge his or her truthfulness.174  
2. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Subject to a Crawford 
Analysis 
Other scholars contend that the constitutionality of two-way 
live video testimony should be considered under Crawford.175 
Crawford held that the prosecution may introduce testimonial 
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statements if the witness is unavailable to testify and if the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.176 
These scholars argue that a witness’s testimony via two-way live 
video is clearly “testimonial” in the traditional sense of the 
word.177 Second, these scholars opine that, when a witness is 
declared unavailable by the court, this satisfies the unavailability 
prong of the Crawford analysis.178 Finally, these scholars argue 
that a present opportunity to cross-examine the witness by video is 
better than a prior opportunity for cross-examination in person.179 
The primary objection to this argument is that Crawford only 
applies to prior hearsay.180 Thus, Crawford should arguably not 
apply to two-way live video testimony for three reasons. First, the 
testimony is not prior to the occurrence of the trial. Instead, the 
testimony is contemporaneous with the trial. Second, the testimony 
is not “out of court” in the traditional sense of the term. Here, the 
testimony is arguably more similar to physical, in-court testimony 
because it is streamed contemporaneously in the courtroom. 
Finally, under a strict textualist reading of the definition of hearsay 
in the Federal Rules of Evidence, two-way live video testimony is 
not hearsay because it is a statement delivered at trial, whereas 
hearsay is defined as a statement not given at trial.181 Consequently, 
Crawford should not govern two-way live video testimony. 
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3. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Subject to a Craig 
Analysis 
Other scholars argue that two-way live video testimony can be 
constitutional under Craig.182 Under Craig, one-way live video 
testimony is constitutional if it: (1) furthers an important public policy; 
and (2) the video system is sufficiently reliable.183 Proponents of 
Craig’s application in the two-way live video context argue that the 
standard easily extends to two-way live video.184 Specifically, the first 
prong of the analysis is the same, ensuring that the circumstances 
further an important public policy similar to protecting child abuse 
victims from further trauma.185 Moreover, two-way live video 
testimony seems to be more reliable than the one-way video that 
the Craig Court considered because now the witness can actually 
see the defendant.186 Thus, the Craig test should apply. 
Nonetheless, critics typically raise two common objections. 
First, some scholars argue that the Court decided Craig uniquely in 
the context of child abuse cases and, thus, its application should be 
confined to child abuse cases.187 In particular, this objection 
focuses on the reason the prosecutor in Craig used one-way video: 
to protect the child from seeing and being in the presence of the 
defendant.188 Accordingly, the intentional use of one-way video 
seems to imply that the Craig Court decided the case exclusively 
for circumstances involving a sexually abused child.189 Therefore, 
Craig should not govern cases with facts that exceed the scope of 
its holding.190 
Another objection is that Craig’s reliability prong did not 
survive Crawford and thus is no longer good law.191 This objection 
stems from the premise that Crawford expressly overturned Ohio 
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v. Roberts.192 The objection also notes that the Craig Court explicitly 
relied upon Roberts’ understanding of reliability.193 Thus, the 
objection deductively argues that Crawford implicitly overturned 
Craig’s reliability prong as well when it overruled Roberts.194 As a 
result, this objection contends that the Craig test is no longer a viable 
doctrine.195 Accordingly, it would be nonsensical to apply bad law to 
two-way live video testimony.196 
4. Two-Way Live Video Testimony Is Always Unconstitutional 
Finally, some scholars argue that two-way live video testimony 
should never be considered constitutional.197 Mirroring many of the 
arguments against the total constitutionality of such testimony, this 
argument emphasizes that two-way live video testimony is not a 
constitutionally permissible substitute for physical confrontation.198 
Particularly, there are many intangibles that may be lost through the 
video transmission, including body language not on camera.199 As a 
result, witnesses may lie more freely, and it may be harder for jury 
members to determine whether the witness is lying.200 Furthermore, 
this argument complains that efficiency alone should not outweigh a 
defendant’s fundamental right to the traditional notion of physical 
confrontation.201 Such justification would lead to abuses by parties 
more interested in efficiency than in protecting the defendant’s 
constitutional rights.202 Thus, such testimony should be 
unconstitutional. 
The primary objection to blanket unconstitutionality is that 
such a rule would fail to provide a safety valve for circumstances 
in which a public policy is so important that bending the rule 
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would make sense.203 For example, under this proposed rule of 
universal unconstitutionality of two-way live video testimony, the 
child in Craig could testify via one-way live video but would not 
have been able to testify via two-way live video, despite the 
important public policy of protecting the child from the presence of 
the defendant. Moreover, if anything, the two-way video provides 
a more reliable means of procuring the testimony than the one-way 
video provided in Craig. Yet, this rule would absolutely bar the 
child’s testimony via two-way live video, even though Craig 
would allow the child to testify via one-way live video. Therefore, 
reasoning ad absurdum, the rule would be unduly restrictive. 
Additionally, one might object that such a rule would 
needlessly dampen courts’ efforts to integrate new technology into 
the courtroom.204 This objection highlights the fact that two-way 
live video testimony would streamline the trial process.205 It would 
alleviate the costs of bringing witnesses physically into the 
courtroom. Moreover, it would efficiently ease the procedural 
stresses of the testimonial process, particularly when it is hard to 
secure and retain witnesses. In sum, courts should be able to 
embrace twenty-first century technology.206 This rule of uniform 
unconstitutionality would inhibit that opportunity for enhanced 
efficiency. 
The numerous proposals as well as the conflicting 
jurisprudence illustrate the unsettled state of the law concerning 
the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. This 
confusion thus requires a workable proposal that can alleviate the 
current tensions.  
III. A SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY STANDARD FOR EVALUATING 
WHETHER TWO-WAY LIVE VIDEO TESTIMONY VIOLATES THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
With these jurisprudential and scholarly trends as a background, 
this Comment proposes a substantial public policy standard for two-
way live video testimony that would square the trends in the lower 
courts, reconcile the various scholarly proposals, and preserve Craig’s 
application to one-way live video testimony. This Part first details the 
aspects of the proposed substantial public policy standard, the 
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reasoning behind the proposal, and the potential functionality of 
the standard. It then discusses various justifications for the 
proposal, highlighting its resolution of the differing opinions 
amongst both courts and scholars. 
A. The Proposal 
In plain terms, the proposed substantial public policy standard for 
two-way live video testimony would demand less of prosecutors than 
the arguably high important public policy prong of the Craig test.207 
The premise of the proposed standard is that two-way live video is 
an inherently more accurate approximation of physical 
confrontation than one-way live video’s approximation of physical 
confrontation.208 Whereas one-way live video does not permit 
mutual, witness–defendant eye contact, two-way live video allows 
the witness to see the defendant. As a result, two-way live video 
enables potential emotional tension more typical of true physical 
confrontation because the witness must virtually testify to the 
defendant’s face. Two-way live video testimony is therefore more 
similar to physical confrontation than is one-way live video 
testimony. Consequently, the standard for two-way live video 
testimony should not be as stringent as the Craig test’s important 
public policy requirement because the testimony via two-way live 
video is not as substantially different from physical confrontation 
as is one-way live video testimony.  
The proposed substantial public policy standard thus would 
allow prosecutors to use two-way live video testimony not only in 
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circumstances where the testimony advances public policies as 
important as protecting child abuse victims, but also in 
circumstances where the public policy advanced is less important 
and yet still substantial enough to promote the administration of 
justice. In practice, courts adopting the substantial public policy 
standard should retain as a compass the decisions from the lower 
courts that have addressed two-way live video testimony. For 
example, courts should adopt the findings of the courts that have 
found that severe illnesses and unavailability due to witness 
protection programs would suffice to satisfy the substantial public 
policy standard.209 Similarly, courts should uniformly affirm the 
use of two-way live video testimony of child abuse victims and 
other child witnesses who may suffer emotional trauma from 
testifying in open court.210 Likewise, this standard would approve 
of the testimony in cases where witnesses have been threatened or 
intimidated in attempts to prevent them from testifying.211 
Moreover, the use of such testimony in cases that advance the 
public policy of protecting national security would be justified 
under the substantial public policy standard.212 Furthermore, the 
proposed standard would allow this testimony in cases concerning 
border issues that present international concerns.213 All in all, the 
substantial public policy standard would permit two-way live video 
testimony in circumstances that entail, inter alia, issues of national 
concern and witnesses’ health and protection.214 
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On the other end of the spectrum, however, courts should also 
adopt the Eleventh Circuit’s general rule that mere efficiency and 
convenience cannot justify the use of two-way live video testimony.215 
To that end, the potential for cost savings would be similarly 
inadequate to satisfy the substantial public policy standard.216 On a 
greater scale, an ambiguous “generalized interest in law enforcement” 
would fail to meet the substantial public policy standard.217 In short, 
prosecutors would have to demonstrate circumstances, which, contrary 
to these efficiency and convenience arguments, entail unique factual 
complications that would not be present in every run-of-the-mill case. 
Building upon these foundations, courts should infer general principles 
that would likely be recognized across the nation as public policies that 
would satisfy the proposed substantial public policy standard. 
B. The Proposal’s Practical and Theoretical Justifications 
The primary virtues of the proposed substantial public policy 
standard lie within its resolution of the various debates surrounding 
the constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. This Section 
first describes the proposal’s resolution of judicial disagreements 
and then turns to its resolution of scholarly disagreements. 
1. Resolution of Judicial Disagreements 
The proposed substantial public policy standard accomplishes 
three important objectives in response to the underlying judicial 
concerns surrounding two-way live video testimony. First, the 
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proposed standard resolves the overarching circuit split between the 
Second Circuit and its sister circuits concerning whether Craig applies 
to two-way live video testimony.218 It does so by borrowing the 
strengths and concerns from both sides of the split. From Gigante, the 
proposal borrows the Second Circuit’s reasoning that proponents of 
two-way live video testimony should not have to satisfy Craig’s 
incredibly high “important public policy” test; instead, prosecutors 
need only meet a less rigorous version of the Craig test.219 From the 
circuits that have adopted Craig in the two-way live video context, the 
proposal concurs with and endorses Craig’s continued application to 
one-way live video testimony, requiring a public policy as important 
as that of protecting child abuse victims.220 The proposal additionally 
incorporates Craig’s understanding that certain public policies justify a 
witness’s physical absence during the witness’s testimony.221 The 
proposal further imports Craig’s understanding that these public 
policies must necessarily be substantial to validate depriving a 
defendant of physical confrontation with a witness.222 Thus, strains of 
reasoning from both sides of the circuit split comprise the substantial 
public policy standard, thereby reconciling the split. 
On a deeper level, the proposal addresses and eliminates the 
confusion amongst lower courts concerning how the Craig test would 
or should apply to two-way live video testimony.223 The courts 
currently engage in a “vertical” analysis to determine whether the 
circumstances surrounding the two-way live video testimony meet the 
Craig test. That is, they first articulate Craig’s holding as the 
governing standard.224 They then illustrate the “important public 
policy” test by highlighting the public policy of protecting child 
abuse victims from further trauma.225 As a result, courts look up to 
this single important policy as emblematic of the types of extreme 
situations that must be present to justify the use of two-way live 
video testimony. This proposal eliminates that hierarchical 
pressure by instead endorsing a “horizontal” analysis. Under this 
analysis and the proposed framework,226 courts would look not up 
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to an extreme standard, but to each other’s decisions in a quest for 
common ground. This process would thus focus courts on more 
common scenarios rather than on the factually unique—and 
incredibly sensitive—child abuse cases for which Craig was 
created. In so doing, the proposal would enable easier judicial 
assent to common lines of reasoning, thereby creating firm 
precedent concerning circumstances where two-way live video 
testimony is constitutional. 
Finally, the proposal mitigates—if not eliminates—the 
opportunities for judicial subjectivity that the Supreme Court so 
heavily denounced in Crawford.227 The proposal’s emphasized 
reliance upon well-recognized, substantial public policies deprives 
courts of the ability to create ad hoc reasons that justify the use of 
two-way live video testimony. Contrary to the Second Circuit’s 
Gigante test and Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this proposal maintains a higher standard than the discretionary 
“exceptional circumstances” and “compelling circumstances” 
standards.228 The proposal guards against case-by-case judicial 
determinations that might create inter-jurisdictional conflicts. Instead, 
the proposal promotes deference to well-recognized public policies, 
thereby requiring public policy to be the source of the rule rather than 
judicial subjectivity. 
2. Resolution of Scholarly Disagreements 
The proposed substantial public policy standard likewise 
answers scholars’ concerns in numerous ways. One notable 
justification for this proposal is that it guards against the potential 
abuses of two-way live video testimony while simultaneously 
quelling fears of the complete unavailability of the option to use 
two-way live video testimony. With respect to the fears that 
prosecutors might rely too heavily upon the ease of such 
testimony,229 this proposal answers those fears by retaining as 
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persuasive Craig’s extremely high “important public policy” test. 
Of course, the substantial public policy standard provides for a less 
stringent interpretation of the Craig test; however, it retains significant 
public policies as the mainstay of the standard, thereby disallowing 
rampant use of the testimony for less important purposes such as 
efficiency. With respect to the fears of the complete unavailability of 
the use of two-way live video testimony,230 this proposal—in 
accordance with Supreme Court precedent—dispels those fears by 
providing for the complete availability of such testimony in 
circumstances that implicate substantial public policies. Instead of 
completely ignoring the advances of technology and its aid in 
obtaining testimony in unique circumstances, this proposal explicitly 
constructs an avenue through which parties may utilize the technology. 
Thus, the proposal eliminates the many fears surrounding the potential 
complete use or potential complete unavailability of two-way live 
video testimony. 
Relatedly, the proposal resolves scholars’ disagreement 
concerning whether Craig should apply to two-way live video 
testimony.231 The proposal agrees with proponents of such an 
application by adopting the general reasoning that undergirded the 
Craig decision. Yet, the proposal also agrees with opponents of such 
an application, preserving and ensuring Craig’s sole application to 
cases involving one-way video testimony and child abuse victims. 
Moreover, the proposal acknowledges the additional objection that 
Craig’s reasoning is no longer good law after Crawford, but the 
proposal simply notes that the Court has cited Craig with approval on 
two occasions after Crawford, specifically relying upon Craig’s 
emphasis on reliability.232 Thus, presumably Craig’s reliability prong 
survived Crawford and therefore justifies continued reliance upon a 
reliability requirement in the context of live video testimony.233 
Lastly, the proposal bridges the gap between disagreements 
concerning whether Crawford’s hearsay analysis should govern by 
acknowledging the strongest arguments from both sides.234 The 
proposal acknowledges that there are circumstances where two-
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way live video testimony allowed under the substantial public 
policy standard would also satisfy Crawford’s requirements of 
witness unavailability and an opportunity for cross-examination of 
the witness.235 However, under the proposed standard, witness 
unavailability should be neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for satisfying the substantial public policy standard. 
Because this proposal is an extension of Craig’s reasoning, the 
proposal should remain true to the factual underpinnings in Craig. 
There, the child was never declared unavailable; indeed, the child 
was actually seemingly available.236 Thus, this apparent lack of a 
requirement of witness unavailability should similarly govern in 
the substantial public policy standard. Taking into account the 
argument that Crawford is completely inapplicable, this proposal 
takes a middle-of-the-road approach, acknowledging that Crawford 
may be satisfied in some circumstances under the proposed standard 
but ultimately agreeing that Crawford should chiefly apply to true 
hearsay alone and not to live video testimony. 
All in all, the proposed substantial public policy standard provides 
the Supreme Court with an efficient, workable standard that 
systematically addresses and alleviates the concerns surrounding the 
constitutionality of two-way live video testimony. Most importantly, it 
remains true to the reasons underlying the Court’s Confrontation 
Clause precedent while simultaneously modifying the precedent to 
adapt to increasingly popular technology and circumstances not at 
issue in that precedent. The proposed standard thus represents an 
attractive solution to an otherwise vexing problem. 
CONCLUSION 
In an era of constant innovation, it makes sense to embrace the 
inevitable technological facelift of the courtroom by amending 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence accordingly. Two-way live 
video testimony has generated uncertainty amongst courts and 
scholars alike, providing spirited discussions and equally spirited 
disagreements. As a result, the Supreme Court should provide 
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guidance to lower courts, dictating the correct path that courts 
should take to determine the constitutionality of two-way live 
video testimony. Moreover, this process should coincide with 
current Supreme Court precedent and assuage the fears of abuse or 
the unavailability of such testimony. The proposed substantial 
public policy standard, which allows furtherance of less important 
public policies to justify the use of the testimony, accomplishes 
these objectives. It takes the arguments from competing sides of 
the current debates and fuses them together in support of the 
proposed standard. This unification is crucial in light of the 
currently conflicted Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. The 
substantial public policy standard presents the best path forward to 
consistently analyzing confrontation in a FaceTime generation. 
 
J. Benjamin Aguiñaga* 
                                                                                                             
 * J.D./D.C.L., 2015, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
Recipient of the 2013–2014 Vinson & Elkins Outstanding Student Casenote or 
Comment Award. I dedicate this work to my closest friend, confidant, and 
partner in crime—my sister, Abigail. I thank my family for their unending love 
and encouragement. I also thank the members of the Louisiana Law Review, in 
particular Minia Bremenstul and Ashley Carver, for their input and unparalleled 
friendship. Finally, I thank Vice Chancellor Cheney Joseph and Professor Ed 
Dawson for their guidance throughout the writing process. Any errors are mine 
alone. 
       
